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In the Supre01e Court of the 
State of Utah 
F AIRFIEI.ID ffiRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNEST CARSON AND MRS. ERNEST 
CARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NO. 7670 
Fairfield Irrigation Company, as successor in interest 
to the original diligence users, is the owner of the flow of 
Fairfield Springs for irrigation, culinary and domestic pur-
poses, subject to whatever rights defendants have acquired 
for stockwatering purposes, on which latter point the low-
er court made no findings. 
The defendants Ernest Carson and wife own the lands 
on which the springs arise and a considerable area sur-
rounding them. Two wells, connected below the ground 
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and therefore often considered as one well, the combined 
flow of which is about 60 gallons. of water per minute, are 
situated on a parcel of land belon~g to defendants, about 
400 feet northerly from, and above, Fairfield Springs. 
The springs and the wells are located just west of the 
Town of Fairfield, in Utah County, Utah. The waters of 
the springs are collected in a pond and flow easterly to and 
below the Town of Fairfield. One of the springs is piped 
for the culinary use of the inhabitants of the town. The 
wells at the time of the institution of this suit were con-
trolled by the defendants, at times being plugged and at 
times being used for irrigation. 
Defendants' EXhibit 15 contains a group of pict~es 
showing the wells when they were plugged but when small 
amounts of water were escaping through bullet holes in the 
pipes. Defendants' Exhibit 17 is another view of one of 
the pipes. Defendants' Exhibit 19 is an air view of the 
pond area and channel leading to the east. Defendants' 
Exhibit 21 is a close-up picture of one of the pipes. De-
fendants' Exhibit 18 is a view from the edge of the pond to-
ward the location of the wells in question which are in the 
vicinity of the telephone poles shown in tne picture. De-
fendants' Exhibit 16 is a view in the opposite direction from 
the vicinity of the wells toward the pond, the head of the 
Fairfield culinary system being shown in the foreground 
(See T 440-450). 
The right to the use of water from wells mentioned 
is the principal subject matter of this controversy, each 
party claiming such right. There are also involved the va-
lidity of plaintiff's application to develop additional waters, 
claimed rights of way and claimed trespasses on defend-
ants' lands. 
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Plaintiff company brought action against defendant• 
seeking, in the first count of its complaint, to have quieted 
its claimed title to the use of the waters flowing from the 
Fairfield Springs and from the two wells in question, the 
source of which plaintiff claimed was interconnected with 
the springs, and to have recognized its claimed right to de-
velop additional water under Application No. 21275 filed 
by it in the office of the State Engineer shortly before the 
institution of the suit; in the second count to have defend-
ans' title or interest in the waters of the two wells declared 
to be held in trust for plaintiff; by the third count to ob-
tain an accounting of profits from the leasing of such well 
water by defendants (R 4-7). Defendants counterclaimed, 
asking that its right to the waters of the wells, and its right 
to use the waters of the springs on their own land for sock-
watering, irrigation and domestic purposes to the extent 
that they had been used in the past, and its title to the land 
surrounding the springs and wells, be quieted as against 
plaintiff, and that it be awarded damages for trespasses of 
the officers and agents of the defendant company, with in-
junctive relief (R 19-21). 
Plaintiff's claim to an accounting was dismissed, and 
the trial court disregarded plaintiff's contention that de-
fendants' title to the wells had been . acquired in trust by 
reason of the complete failure of proof and the abandon-
ment of such claim. However, findings were made to. the 
effect that plaintiff was the owner of the springs and the 
wells through usage; that defendants were the owners of 
the land in question subject to an easement in favor of 
plaintiff to go upon the channels leading from the springs 
and from the wells (R 95-105). A decree was entered 
quieting the respective rights so found, recognizing the 
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claimed right of plaintiff as owner of Application No. 21275 
to proceed thereon through the office of the State Engineer 
to develop additional waters on defendants' lands, and en-
joining the defendants from interfering with the flow of 
the wells or with the asserted right of plaintiff company 
to go upon defendants' lands along the water courses to 
and about the springs and wells, and to remove obstruc-
tions within the water courses, and plugs or other obstruc-
tions upon or within said wells. Defendants were award-
ed nominal damages against the plaintiff for trespass be-
yond the easements found to exist, but the court refused 
to grant defendants any injunctive protection against. threat-
ened future trespass (R 111-114). 
From the trial court's judgment the defendants have 
appealed to this Court (R 117), it being maintained by 
them that various findings are not supported by the evi-
dence and that conclusions and the decree of the court 
against the defendants are not supported by the findings 
and are contrary to law. The defendants contend that they 
arE' the owners of the wells as the owners of the land on 
which the wells were driven and as successors in interest 
to Sunshine Water Line Company, the ·admitted original 
appropriators of the water therefrom; that this must be 
deemed private water, and its use was never abandoned or 
forfeited; that the plaintiff or its predecessors in interest 
never made any valid appropriation thereof; that even 
though it were considered that the water were public wa-
ter and had been abandoned or forfeited by Sunshine Wa-
ter Line Company or its successors prior thereto, the de-
fendants by diversion and beneficial use through the Man-
ning Gold Mines Company before 1935 validly appropri-
ated it; that the plaintiff by usage, grant' or otherwise has 
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acquired no interest in the water or in defendants' lands 
for rights of way, or otherwise, except in connection with 
the existing springs as distinguished from the wells; that 
the plaintiff's application for appropriation filed in 1950 
is subject to defendants' rights, if not entirely void and in-
effectual; that while plaintiff is the owner of the flow of 
water from the Fairfield Springs, this is subject to defend-
ants' right for stockwatering purposes, and that the de-
fendants are entitled to injunctive protection against the 
plaintiff's threatened continued trespasses upon their land. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Plaintiff is a corporation organized in November, 1939. 
It succeeded to the rights of diligence users from the Fair-
field Springs initiated as early as the 1860's (R 95; Articles, 
File 1449 received as Exhibit). The springs are numer-
ous and are located on land owned by defendants (T 402-
403; Def. Ex. 2) in the South half of Section 29 and the 
North half of Section 32, Township 6 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in an area over which the 
water is impounded before being conveyed easterly for use 
by the stockholders of plaintiff company, including defend-
tlllts. It appears that no development work was ever done 
on the springs until 1949 when the pond was dredged and 
enlarged by oral permission of the defendant Ernest Car-
son on conditions that were not complied with (T 57-59; 
Def. Ex. 21). The springs yield a cornbined flow of be-
tween 4¥2 and 7 cubic feet of water per second (R 95). 
The two wells in question respectively are located 
433.8 feet north and 130.6 feet east from the section cor-
ner common to Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32 of Township 6 
South, Rlange 2 West, and north 433 feet and east 122.6 
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feet from the same corner; upon 1.9 acres of land which 
defendants contracted to buy from D. L. Thomas in _1930, 
the warranty deed from Thomas being dated April 14, 
1930, but bing held in escrow pending completion of pay-
ments by Carson after the grantor's death (Def. Ex. 7; 
File 5366 Probate in evidence). This deed covered the 1.9 
acres of land "together with the water appurtenant and 
belonging consisting of a flowing well". The two wells, by 
reason of their interconnection underground, were com-
monly regarded as one well, and by mention of a well, the 
two wells were intended (T 201-202). 
The 1.9 acres of land was acquired by Sunshine Water 
Line Company, a Utah corporation, from W. A. Sherman 
and wife on December 2, 1898 (Def. Ex. 2, p. 5), at which 
time and up until the development work by the corpora-
tion there were no wells, springs or other indications of 
water on the land, nor any channel leading from the po-
sition of the wells, the position of the wells being high and 
dry (R 96; T 152-153, 192-195). 
About the year 1900 the Sunshine Water Line Com-
pany drilled the two wells, which were connected with a 
pipe below the surface of the ground. One of the wells was 
approximately 80 feet deep and the other approximately 
160 feet deep, and both tapped undergground water sour-
ces not connected with the Fairfield Springs, with suffi-
cient pressure to flow over the casing at a combined rate 
of approximately 60 gallons per minute, at which rate they 
have continued to flow ever since except when plugged 
(R 96-10-; T 384-386, 186, 291-292, 303, 397-398). The 
wellse are 375 feet from the spring pond at its nearest, and 
are 8¥2 feet higher than the water surface of the springs 
(T 106). 
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The flow of the wells by the Sunshine Water Line 
Company was collected into a sump which had been pre-
viously dug by it, and from there the water was pumped 
to a distant mining operation, and as long as this operation 
continued none of the water ever left the land where it was 
found except by a pipeline belonging to the company, and 
the water was wholly and beneficially used by it continu-
ously until 1905, when the pumping operations ceased (R 
.97; T 160). 
In 1905 the Sunshine Water Line Company failed to 
pay taxes upon its pipeline and pumping equipment, and 
on the 1.9 acres of land, and a certificate of tax sale was 
issued. In 1909 a further certificate of sale for 1908 taxes, 
added to the 1905 taxes, appears. There is a further cer-
tificate of sale for the 1909 taxes. So far as the record 
shows, there was no May sale nor auditor's tax deed is~ 
sued (R 97; See Def's Ex. 2). The pipe line leading to the 
Sunshine mine was removed sometime between 1905 and 
1913, although the pump house remained on the property 
until after 1913 (T 10-11, 233, 308, 432, 809). The well 
water after 1905 flowed off the ·company's land, over land 
owned by Ernest Carson's father (T 29, 39) and into the 
spring area, where the well waters commingled with the 
waters of the springs and were used at least from time to 
time (T 12) by the water users from the Fairfield Springs, 
including D. L~ Thomas (R 97; T 248, 338, 401) and per-
haps the Sunshine Water Company (T 208). 
On August 4, 1913, D. L. Thomas obtained a quit-claim 
deed from Ultah County covering the 1.9 acres on which 
the wells were situated (Def's Ex. 2, p. 14). Thereaft~r, 
he brought an action against the Sunshine Water Line 
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Company to quiet his title to the land, and obtained a de-
cree on August 31, 1915 (R 97; Def's Ex. 2, p. 15). 
From 1913 to 1930, during the time D. L. Thomas had 
title to the land, and perhaps before, a standpipe was in-
stalled by him in connection with the wells, through which 
the water flowed, at which Thomas, farmers, sheep men 
and others filled their tanks for culinary use, without ob-
jection from Thomas (T 31-33, 167, 178, 200, 256-257). 
Thomas claimed the wells and no one else claimed any 
rights to them. Use of the water was presumably with 
his permission (T 72, .82, 179, 200, 201, 275-276). The wa-
ter which was not ta~en away in tanks by Thomas and oth-
ers, or consumed by flowing on the area between the wells 
and the springs commingled with the spring waters and 
was used by Thomas and other users 9f Fairfield Spring 
water for irrigation, although from time to time the wa-
ter was shut off at the standpipe (T 12, ~1-32, 238, 248, 436-
437). 
In 1930 Ernest Carson entered into a contract with 
D. L. Thomas for the purchase of the 1.9 acres of land, in-
cluding the wells, and the deed was placed in escrow (T 
40). At that time the water from the wells was running 
through a single standpipe, and the wells were generally 
referred to as one well (T 402). The deed described the 
1.9 acres and conveyed and warranted also the "water ap-
purtenant and belonging consisting of a flowing well" 
(Def's Ex. 7) .. Carson spread the water over his land ly-
ing between the wells and the springs and otherwise con-
trolled it (T 55, 61). 
On October 4, 1933, the defendant Carson entered into 
a written agreement with the Manning Gold Mines Co., re-
citing that he was the owner of certain waters flowing from 
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artesian wells at Fairfield and that the company was in 
need of additional waters for the operation of its reduction 
mill at Manning, Utah, said wells being on the 1.9 acres 
O\vned by defendants. The right to the use of the well wa-
ter, together with any additionally developed water, was 
leased to the company for a period of ten years (Def's Ex. 
2, pp. 23-24). This agreement, with a similar agreement 
of lease to the same company from the administrator of 
the D. L. Thomas estate, to be operative if Ernest Carson 
did not complete his purchase agreement (which he did), 
was approved and confirmed by the probate ·court of Utah 
County on January 4, 1934 (Def's Ex. 2, pp. 16-22) and 
in the same proceedings, the 1.9 acres of land and the wells 
were inventoried as a part of the D.L. Thomas Estate, sub-
ject to defendant's contract of purchase (File 5366 probate 
in evidence) . 
The first use of the water at Manning, as indicated 
by the power company's records, occurred in December, 
1933, and the power was disconnected on August 1, 1937 
(T 308). There is no question about the diversion of the 
water during this period and that the water was used bene-
ficially (T 434). After pumping to Manning ceased, it was 
thought that the company might continue use of the water 
at Mercur, but defendants learned to the contrary in 1939, 
and since that time they have used and controlled the wa-
ter as they have seen fit, keeping them closed, or using 
them as they desired, except that they have ·capped the 
wells during winters as the result of a visit of a represen-
tative of the State Engineer's office (T 26-27, 64, 374, 378-
379, 438-439) . 
In about 1936 the defendants received notice that they 
had to file a claim on their wells by a certain time. An 
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underground water claim was filed under date of March 
19, 1936, in the office of the State Engineer, with the as-
sistance of a representative of the State Engineer's office, 
who assisted in making out the claim. The claim refers to 
only one well, but at that time both wells were intercon-
nected and were considered as one well (T 45-46) . This 
claim, numbered 10987 in the office of the State Engineer, 
states the claimed flow of the well at 60 gallons of water 
per minute, and claims the water for irrigation and for 
stockwatering, domestic or milling purposes. Under gen-
eral remarks, it states: 
"The undersigned claims ownership of the above 
described waters as a part of its freehold; that said 
water is not in any event subject to appropriation as 
public water, but that the undersigned may at its pleas-
ure put such water to use, or otherwise dispose of it; 
and the filing of the claim shall in no event or circum-
stance be construed as a waiver of any right by the 
undersigned. This water is used for irrigation pur-
poses when not otherwise used." (Def. Ex. 1). 
Ever since the drilling of the wells in question, and 
continuing up to shortly before the commencement of the 
present suit, no persons other than Sunshine Water Line 
Company, D. L. Thomas, and the defendants, during their 
respective ownerships, have ever claimed water from the 
wells, have ever exercised any dominion or control over 
them, or have ever protested the control and use by de-
fendants and their predecessors under claim of right, de-
spite, full, complete- and general knowledge, both by pub-
lic record and actual notice, of such claims and use (T 33-
34, 54-55, 72, 83, 94, 179, 188-192, 201, 204, 219, 275-276, 
298-301, 334, 336-337, 269, 373, 394-395; Def. Exs. 1, 6, 
14; Probate file 5366). 
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Less than a month before the present suit was insti-
tuted, plaintiff filed purported Application No. 21275 to 
appropriate ten second feet of water from "Fairfield Spring 
area." A large tract of land is described, including the 
wells, and designated a "spring area", and it is proposed by 
the application "to appropriate all of the water from the 
springs and spring area and from the wells, which has not 
heretofore been appropriated." It is further proposed un-
der said application "To develop new water which is not 
no\v issuing from the "spring area". Most of the land de-
scribed belongs to the defendants (Pl. Ex. "'C"). 
In this statement, we have been unable to follow very 
closely the court's Findings of Fact, since so many of them 
are mere argument, or conclusions of law. The forego-
ing summary, consisting largely of facts concerning which 
there is no dispute, but a number of which have been slant-
ed or ignored by the court's findings, should be sufficient 
at the outset to enable the reader to obtain a general idea 
of the controlling record. 
In our Statement of Points, we shall refer hereafter to 
the gist of the findings of the court which we do not be-
lieve to be justified by the evidence and to the conclusions 
and decree of the court which we claim to be unauthorized 
and contrary to law. We shall also set out additional im-
portant facts, with references to the record, under the vari-
ous headings of our Argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in failing to find that defendants 
were the owners of the wells and well-water in question, 
as successors in interest to Sunshine Water Line Company; 
and that Findings Nos. 10, 11, 12, 22 and other purported 
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Findings indicating the contrary, are not supported by the 
evidence; and that the court's Conclusions Nos. 2, 4, 7 and 
11, and paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 10 of the Decree to the ef-
fect that plaintiff and not defendants is the owner of such 
water, are not suported by the Findings, nor the evidence, 
and are contrary to law 
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the court's 
Findings 7, 9 and 10 to the effect that Sunshine Water 
Line Company abandoned or forfeited the wells or the wa-
ter therefrom, and that Conclusions of Law No.6 and para-
graph 9 of the Decree to the same effect are not supported 
by the evidence, nor the Findings, and are contrary to law. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to support the court's 
Findings 12, 16 and 22 that plaintiff or its predecessors by 
usage since 1905 have diverted, beneficially used and ap-
propriated the waters of the wells and that Conclusions 2, 
7, 10 and 11, and paragraphs 2 and 10 of the Decree, recog-
nizing such claimed appropriation, are not ·supported by 
the evidence nor the Findings and are· contrary to law. 
4. The court erred in failing to find, irrespective of 
whether the well-water was private water or had been or 
had not been abandoned or forfeited, that the defendants 
and those in privity with them, made the first lawful di-
version and beneficial use of said waters, as underground 
waters, and duly appropriated, diverted and beneficiallly 
used said waters as underground waters prior to 1935 and 
prior to the time any rights of plaintiff or its predecessors 
could have attached; and in failing to conclude and decree 
that defendants are the owners of the right to the use of 
the flow from said wells, and that the court's Findings 
Nos. 12, 13, 19 and 22 to the contrary are not supported 
by the evidence, and Conclusions Nos. 4, 7 and 11, and 
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paragraphs 2, 5, 10 and 11 of the Decree are not supported 
by the Findings or the evidence and are contrary to law. 
5. The court erred in its Findings Nos. 14, 15 and 
17 to the effect that defendants had acqquired no vested 
right to have the well water flow in its existing channel, 
or rights in the springs except as stockholder of plaintiff 
company; but that the plaintiff by reason of its ownership 
of the water from the well, and past usage, had acquired 
various rights of way or other rights in the defendants' 
lands and in the pipe, caps, casings and other property of 
defendants, to enter, maintain, repair, remove and other-
wise exercise dominion and control over the same; that 
such Findings are not supported by the evidence and that 
Conclusion No. 11 and paragraphs 6 and 10 of the Decree 
on the same subject matter, and granting plaintiff an in-
junction against interference by the defendants, are not 
supported by the evidence or the Findings and are con-
trary to law. 
6. The court erred in its Findings 17 by limiting the 
trespasses found to have been committed by plaintiff to 
one or two occasions, and in failing to find repeated tres-
passes by plaintiff and the threat of continued trespasses 
against their property, and in failing to conclude and de-
cree that defendants were entitled to injunctive relief 
against plaintiff in the vindication and protection of their 
property rights. 
7. The court's F1indings 12, 18 and 19 to the extent 
that they assume to recognize the validity of plaintiff's 
Application No. 21275 or the right to proceed on plaintiff's 
land thereunder, are not supported by the evidence, and 
that Conclusion No. 7 and paragraph 3 of the Decree on 
the same subject, are contrary to law and are not sup-
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ported by any Findings of Fact; that the court eiTed in 
not finding and concluding that the said application as the 
basis for any rights upon defendants' lands except in exist-
ing springs, was and is contrary to law, unauthorized and 
V<?id, and in any event, is sub~ect and inferior to the prop-
erty rights of the defendants in and to their lands, the said 
wells and the water therefrom, 
The foregoing points, under corresponding headings, 
will be discussed in order. 
ARGUlVIENT 
1. Uefendants o~ the wells and the right to their 
flow as successors in interest to Sunshine Water Line Com-
pany whether such right be regarded as an appropriated 
right or as an incident to the ownership of the land itseH. 
It was stipulated that the right to the use of the wa-
ter issuing from the wells was owned by Sunshine Water 
Line Company (R 46). This company drove the wells and 
installed in .the ground the physical .material comprising 
them. It had title to the ground. No means for intercep-
tion or diversion of the water were ever installed by plain· 
tiff or its predecessors in title. 
D. L. Thomas acquired title to the land from Sunshine 
Water Line ~c·ompany by tax deed from .Utah County and 
through a suit to quiet title (Def. E·x. 2). He installed a 
standpipe leading a short distance .from the wells {T 167, 
168, 178) which was the only addition ever made to them 
other than by the defendants. This physical equipment 
was a part of land. The well water was made available on 
the land thereby, as there were no surface waters (T 178). 
The wells were appurtenant to the land and formed a part 
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of it (Findings 8, R 98). They passed from Sunshine Water 
Line Company to D. L. Thomas. Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal. 
274, 44 Pac. 564. 
Ernest Carson received a warranty deed from D. L. 
Thomas covering the land in question, "together with the 
water appurtenant and belonging, consisting of a flowing 
well" (Def. Ex. 1). The two wells were interconnected 
below the ground and were considered one well (T 45-46). 
The defendants still own the land on which the wells are 
situated and surrounding land, and there is neither find-
ings nor evidence that they ever transferred the wells or 
the flow therefrom; the undisputed evidence being that the 
wells were considered as being separate and apart from 
the Fairfield Springs (T 38, 43, 54, 55, 278, 279, 286, 296-
297, 337-338, 414-417, 421-431, 473-474, 475). 
We thus have involved wells on defendants' lands, ac-
quired by them prior to 1935, tapping underground sources 
not connected with any other land so far as the record dis-
closes. There is no proof whatsoever that the water is 
from an artesian basin extending off that land, but it is 
apparent that at the time the defendants acquired their 
title, prior to 1935, the source of the wells was percolating 
water under any concept. 
It is unnecessary to cite the numerous Utah cases on 
percolating water, prior to 1949, and particularly prior to 
1935, since in the latter year, Wrathall v. Johnson, et al, 
86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 755 and in 1949, Riordan v. Westwood, 
___ u. , 203 P.2d 922, exhaustively reviewed 
the decisions. Riordan v. Westwood points out (p. 925) 
that until Wrathall v. Johnson in 1935, "the decisions of 
this court treated th~ waters of artesian basins as perco-
lating waters, and as such ,fue ownership went with the 
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owner of the ground where such water was located and 
were not considered to be subject to appropriation." With 
respect to percolating waters in general, the Riordan case 
states (P. 924): 
"This court throughout its history has recognized 
that percolating waters are not public waters but be-
long to the soil through which they pass and are the 
property of the owner thereof, and are not the sub-
ject of appropriation (Citing numerous authorities)". 
The conclusion is then arrived at by the court that un-
der the present concept percolating watrs are public wa-
ters and subject to appropriation, and the comment is made 
(p. 927) that "The question of what water is subject to 
appropriation must be determined on our present stand-
ards and concepts and we must treat that question as 
though our concepts and standards had always been as 
they are now." The case did not involve water developed 
prior to 1935, but an application was filed with the State 
Engineer in 1946 to appropriate the water from an unde-
veloped seep and was based upon legislation enacted since 
1935 (pp. 926-927). As applied to the case at bar, the 
last quoted comment of the Court is dicta, and· has no ·ap-
plication to it. 
Prior to 1935, ~at the time when the defendants and 
their successors in interest, for valuable consideration, ob-
tained title to the land on which the wells were drilled, the 
unbroken line of decisions of this Court, universally recog-
nized in legislation and practice, was to the effect that the 
waters of the wells were private waters belonging to the 
owners of the land. Such decisions and practice were rules 
of property, on the basis of which numerous property 
rights, including those of defendants, had vested. The ap-
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lication of the changed .concept to such vested property 
rights would throw titleS into confusion and would deprive 
persons who had bargained for, and secured, rights there-
under of their property without due process of law. 
The rule of judicial decision as precedence is treated 
in 14 Am. Jur. "Courts", Sec. 59-84, pp. 283, et seq. The 
rule in effect is the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
to court decisions. It finds its support in the sound prin-
ciple that when courts have announced, for the guidance 
and government of individuals and the public, certain eon-
trolling principles of law, or have given a construction to 
statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied 
in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles 
have been promulgated and after these ·constructions have 
been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby dis-
turbing contract rights that had been entered into, and 
property rights that had been acquired upon the faith ap.d 
credit that the principle aru1ounced or the construction 
adopted in the opinion, was the law of the land. Ibid, Sec. 
60. The rule seems to apply with peculiar force and strict-
ness to decisions which have determined questions respect-
ing real property and vested rights. Ibid, Sec. 65; Douglas 
v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L.ed 968 is cited as an 
application, wherein the Court said that the true rule is 
to give a ehange of judicial construction in respect to a 
statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and 
existing contract rights that would be given to a legislative 
amendment; ·that is to say, make it prospective, but not 
retroactive. 
We, therefore, maintain that under well established 
rules of property applicable at the time, defendants prior 
. to 1935 acquired not only the wells themselves but the 
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right to the water therefrom and ever since have owned 
said wells and have applied the water to ·a beneficial use. 
The rights of rthe defendants, however, as successors 
in title to Sunshine Water Line Company are not wholly 
dependent upon the last stated proposition. If it assumed 
that Sunshine Water Une Company obtained and held ad-
mitted rights to the flow of the water from the wells by 
virtue of an appropriation, we contend that such rights 
likewise passed to the defendants through D. L. Thomas 
as successors in interest. Such appropriated flow would be· 
likewise appurtenant to the land and would pass by the 
transfers in the chain of title, there being no reservations 
of the right to use the W!aters from the wells on such land. 
Leman J. McKinney, who was one of the few of plain-
tiffs witnesses who knew ·anything about the early ·history 
of the wells, admitted that Sunshine used the water, that 
no one ever claimed to the contrary, and that Thomas 
agreed to sell the land, including the wells, to Ernest Car-
son; that the witness was a user under the Fairfield Springs, 
and that he didn't question Mr. Thomas' right to sell the 
wells and knew of no one else who questioned that right 
(T 92-93). McKinney further testified that he was one of 
the app:misers of the Thomas estate !and as a part of that 
estate appraised the 1.9 acres of land and the flowing well 
·as a part of that estate (subject to defendants' contract to 
purchase) (T 92-93). He said he had no reason to ques-
tion Mr. Thomas' right or Ernest Carson's right (T 94). 
William C. Thomas, the nephew of D. L. Thomas, who 
was the only other plaintiff's witness who knew much about 
the early history of the wells, was administrator of the very 
estate through which Carson's purchase of the land an.d 
wells was ·completed. He swore to the inventory of the 
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\veils as the property of the estate, subject to Carson's con~ 
tract (Probate File No. 5366 in evidence.) He didn't know 
anybody who was claiming any rights to the wells except 
D. L. Thomas, and added that naturally the latter was 
claiming them "or he wouldn't have bought them" (T 179). 
The only theory under which the right to the waters 
of the wells could be said not to have passed to the de:Cend-
ants as successor in title to Sunshine Water Lines Com-
pany, the admitted owner of that right, would be that of 
forfeiture or abandonment. This brings us to our next 
point. 
2. The right to the well waters was not abandoned 
or forfeited by Sunshine Water Line Company or by D. L. 
Thomas prior to its transfer to defendants. 
The theory on which the lower court awarded the well 
water to plaintiff is reflected in its Findings 7, 9 and 10, 
to the effect that Sunshine Water Line ·Company ceased 
using the water when it discontinued pumping in 1905, and 
because it did not pay taxes on the pipeline or the land, it 
evidenced an intent to abandon the waters; by its Conclu-
sions and Decree that there was an abandonment and for-
feiture of the waters by that company prior to the time 
Thomas acquired the land ,and that the pl'aintiff and its 
predecessors appropriated the abandoned and forfeited wa-
ter prior to acquisition of title by defendants. 
We shall show under the next heading that the plain-
tiff or its predecessors made no valid appropriation under 
any theory, and thereafter that defendants by valid di-
version, appropriation and benefici~al use of the under-
ground waters of the wells did complete a valid appropri-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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terest to the original users. The latter propositions would 
defeat plaintiff's claimed rights in the wells irrespective 
of the question of abandonment. At this point, however, 
we submit that the water was neither abandoned nor for-
feited by Sunshine, nor by Thomas, and that, therefore, 
the right passed to the defendants as their successors in 
interest. This alone would be sufficient to reverse the de-
cree of the trial ~court. 
Ch. 108, Sec. 52, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905, refers to. 
one who "abandons or ceases to use water for a period of 
seven years''. In the event specified therein the ''water 
reverts to the public and can be again appropriated a:s pro-
vided in this act; but questions of abandonment shall be 
questions of fact and shall be determined as are other ques-
tions of fact.'' 
We again refer to the principle discussed under the 
preceding heading, that the waters of the wells under the 
rules uniformly applied prior to 1935, were not public wa-
ters. It is clear that the statute cited has reference only 
to public waters, since it mentions "reversion to the pub-
lic.'' The wells and the flow thereof could be abandoned 
or forfeited under the statute no more than the land of 
which they formed a part. If there were an abandonment 
of the water it would be not to the public or any other in-
dividual but to the owner of the land himself, as a part of 
his freehold. Percolating water was deemed part of the 
soil, even more so than the casings and pipes themselves. 
The ownership· of the latter was an incident to the owner-
ship of the freehold, as was the right to flow percolating 
water through it. The intentions of the Sunshine Water 
Uine Company and the effect of their acts or omissions 
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must be judged by the rules of law as they were uniformly 
applied as of that time. Its vested property rights nnder 
such rules was involved and they could not be deemed to 
have been lost by virtue of the statute. 
The application of the foregoing principles seems fatal 
to plaintiff's position. However, for the moment, let it be 
considered that the waters of the wells must be deemed 
then to have been public waters. In such event we also 
question the facts on which the claimed abandonment or 
forfeiture is predicated, and we maintain that the Conclu-
sion and Decree are at variance with the evidence, not jus-
tified even by the Findings, and are contrary to law. 
After Sunshine quit pumping there was a caretaker, 
and D. L. Thomas was supposed to have the land in charge 
before he bought it (T 30). He was a water user under 
the Fairfield Spring system from 1905 to 1930 (T 401), 
and during that time, he with other water users used the 
entire stream in turns. It was 6 or 7 years after Sunshine 
quit pumping that the pipe was all taken up (T 233). Fol-
lowing 1905 the wells were either capped or were used by 
various farmers and others to fill their tanks, or pernrltted 
to flow into the Fairfield Spring pond and from there 
used by Thomas and others for irrigation. It is true that 
the record shows a tax sale certificate, covering the pipe-
line and also the land for 1905, but it also shows tax sale 
certificates covering the same property as late as 1909 and 
1910, assessed against Sunshine Water Line Company. In 
the application to appropriate No. 21275 (Pl. Ex. "C"), filed 
by plaintiff's predecessor in interest, it appears under "Ex-
planatory'' that ''The water from the wells was used for 
a short period of time in about 1910", and that it was after 
this that the water was claimed to have been abandoned. 
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On August 4, 1913, D. L. Thomas received his deed from 
Utah County (Def. Ex. 2). The pump house built for use 
by the Sunshine Water Line Company remained on the 
land until after D. L. Thomas acquired it (T4432). He 
hauled water away from the wells and let other people do 
so (T 31-33). He put in a standpipe to fill the tanks and 
it is elear that the use by others, whether to haul away for 
culinary purposes, or for irrigation through the Spring 
pond, was permissive (T 31, 167, 178, 179, 200, 201, 275-
276, 456, 457). 
Abandonment and forfeiture are not favored, and per-
missive use by others of water inures to the benefit of the 
true owners and prevents the operation of the statutes deal-
ing with abandonment. Zezi, et al v. Lightfoot, et al, (Ida-
ho) 68 P.2d 50. On the other hand, a forfeiture does not 
occur as long as the appropriator, or an adverse user, is 
using the water since forfeituer is not favored. Wellsville 
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 
U. 448, 137 P.2d 634. Whether use through the spring pond 
and by hauling the water away was adverse or permissive 
as regards the Sunshine Wate·r Une Company, it appears 
that there W)ould be no forfeiture or abandonment. A 
change of nature or place of use, even though unauthorized, 
does not involve any forfeiture or abandonment of the 
right. Rocky Fiord Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir 
Co .. , 104 .U. 216, 140 P.2d 638. 
There was no abandonment or forfeiture whether the 
waters be deemed priViate or public waters. The court 
based its Conclusionu largely upon the failure of the Sun-
shine Water Line Company to pay taxes. It would be a 
dangerous doctrine, indeed, if every person who let his 
taxes go delinquent, or let other people use his water when 
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he did not need it, or caped his wells whether at the re-
quest of the State Engineer or on his own volition, were 
held to have abandoned or forfeited his water right. We 
do not think that on the evidence or under the law, plain-
tiff, which had the burden of proof, made out a case of 
forfeiture or abandonment. Moreover, even though the 
statutory period had elapsed, the defendants as owners 
resumed use of the water before other rights attached as 
will hereafter be shown, and their rights therefore should be 
recognized. Wagoner v. Jeffery, et ux, (Idaho) 162 P.2d 
400. 
8. The plaintiff or its predecessors in interest did not 
validly appropriate the flow of water from the w.ells by 
usage, there being proved no intent to appropriate, no di-
version, and no beneficial use other than a mere permissive 
one under the owners of the right, and since, in any ev~nt, 
any purported appropriation was of surface waters after 
they had lost their underground character, with no appli-
mtion being filed in the office of tbe State Engineer until 
after defendants' rights from every standpoint had become 
vested. 
In Wrathall v. Johnson, et al, 86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 755, 
the essentials of a valid appropriation, apart from the fil-
ing of an application, are summarized in the following 
words, (p. 785) : 
"The law in this western ·country has always been, 
and we think it now is, that the essentials of a valid ap-
propriation of water consist of, first, an intent to ap-
propriate and use, however manifested; second, an ac-
tual construction of diverting works, followed by an 
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actual diversion of the water; and third, the applica-
tion of a definite quantity of the water to a useful and 
beneficial purpose.'' 
There was never any intent to appropriate and use the 
w·ell water by the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff 
company. The two witnesses produced by plaintiff who 
were best acquainted with the history of the wells and who 
were both users under the Fairfield Springs, admitted that 
they didn't question Mr. Thomas' right to the wells, that 
they didn't know of anyone else who did or who was claim .. 
ing any rights to the wells when Thomas owned them (T 
92, 93, 179). The first time anyone ever questioned the 
defendants' right to the well water was in the Fall preced-
ing the institution of this suit (T 54-55). It was generally 
known through the Town of Fairfield and among the water 
users that the defendants claimed the well water and was 
leasing it, and no one ever questioned this right or made 
any protest (T 219, 236, 275, 394-395). There was never 
any intent manifested in any way to appropriate the well 
water as a part of the springs, and ever since Sunshine be-
gan using the well water, it was never considered a part of 
the springs (T 38, 43; also citations in "Statement of 
Fact"). 
There was no construction of diverting works or any 
diversion by the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, 
or by the plaintiff. Whatever water was used by the spring 
water users from the well found its way off defendants' 
land and down into the springs without any act, construc-
tion of works or effort of any kind on the part of the low-
er users. There is not even a suggestion in the record that 
the company or those whom it claims under, during the 
time the trial court found the water had been apropriated, 
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or at all, \vent upon defendants' land in the vicinity of the 
wells, to turn water down or to uncap the wells, or to make 
any channels or to do any other act whatsoever that might 
be interpreted as a diversion. The record is conclusive 
that any use made by plaintiff or its predecessors in inter-
est was a permissive use in recognition of the rights of the 
owners of the wells. Under such circumstances the neces-
sary elements of a valid appropriation just are not present, 
either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, even as-
suming that the water in question was public water and 
subject to appropriation as such during the time the court 
found it had been appropriated, which we deny. 
Moreover, the plaintiff and its predecessors, to the ex-
tent that they used the well water at all, did so as surface 
water, and had to appropriate it, if at all, under the rules 
aplicable to such surface water flowing in natural chan-
nels. Particularly, if it be contended that diverting works 
were already constructed below the springs, it is apparent 
that the water diverted therefrom did not at such point 
retain its character as underground water so as to be sub-
ject to appropriation between 1903 and 1935 without the 
filing of an application before the State Engineer. 
The party having the burden must rely upon the 
strength of his own title. He must show in such case all 
appropriation by application to the State Engineer unle~ 
his appropriation was before 1903, which it is undisputed 
was not the case with respect to plaintiff's claimed rights. 
Wellsville East Field liT. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock 
Co., supra. In Wrathall v. Johnson, supra, it is clearly in-
dicated that surface waters, or waters flowing in well de-
fined channels, can be appropriated after 1903 only through 
application filed with the State Engineer. Peterson v. 
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Lund, 57 U:. 162, 193 Pac. 1087 indicates that in acquiring 
the use of water flowing from springs, their source in per-
colating water is not ·controlling and it must be appropri-
ated as surface water in the place where ~diverted. 
If sub-surface streams flow in clearly defined -chan-
nels, or if water developed by another is permitted to flow 
into a natural stream and is abandoned by the developer, 
it can then be apropriated by another only in compliance 
with the law of appropriation governing surface streams. 
Harriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah, 69 Pac. 719. 
It seems implicit in the opinion in Lehi Irrigation Co. 
v. Jones, ___ u , 202 P.2d 892, that when diver-
sions are made of surface waters they must be filed upon 
by application before the State Engineer, irrespective of 
where or how they originally are supplied---Jwhether by 
foreign or developed waters, seepage or otherwise- and 
that though they might be appropriated as a surface flow, 
this does not mean that the original owners may not re-
capture them or withhold them in proper ~cases. Also, in 
the case of Silver King Cons. Mining Oo. v. Sutton, 85 U. 
97, 39 P.2d 682, it is indicated that water reaching a stream, 
lake or other source and constituting the supply from 
which it may be diverted, and which reaches the point of 
diversion by movement from the natural source or ar,ti-
ficial source so remote as to be considered a natural source,_ 
is subject to the law of appropriation governing surface 
streams. 
The waters of the wells through the spring pond ·could 
not be appropriated by plaintiff by usage as underground 
water, but if appropriated at all in the manner claimed by 
plaintiff, this would have to be through ·an application in 
the State Engineer's office. No application was filed by 
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plaintiff or its predecessors until plaintiff filed Application 
· No. 21275 on January 5, 1950. We next refer to the rights 
of the defendants accruing in the meantime. 
4. Should it be considere.~ that defendants did not 
have any vested right to t~ waters from the wells t~ereto­
fore and that they were public waters, defendants by com-
pleted appropriation of them as underground waters 
through diversion and use at Manning and otherwise prior 
to 1935, validly appropria~ the entire flow and ever since, 
defendants have maintained said right and are the exclu-
sive owners thereof. 
As pointed out heretofore, the deed from D. L .. Tho-
mas to Ernest Carson, dated 1\lpril 14, 1930, specifically 
conveyed the land as well as the water from the wells. 
Ever since the defendants thus acquired the land and wells 
in 1930 (Mrs. Carson in this brief being indicated as a joint 
owner for ·convenience, although her record interest is that 
of a wife), they have in good faith claimed the wells as 
their own, eontrolled the water as they saw fit, paid all 
taxes on the land, used the water f.or the irrigation of about 
an acre of land next to the wells and used, with other users 
under Fairfield Springs, any excess water that got into the 
springs from the wells (T 55). They· not only capped the 
wells at times, but spread the ·water on their land and built 
diversion ditches as far back as 1930 for use on their land 
between the wells and springs (T 61, 375, 392-393). 
In 1933, defendants entered into a lease of the well 
waters with Mann·ing Gold Mines Company and this com-
·pany used the water constantly under the defendants for 
milling pwposes from 1934 until at least 1937 (T 51-52); its 
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pumps, connected directly onto the wells, were running 
generally 24 hours per day. The agreement of lease, dated 
October 4, 1933, recited that Ernest Carson was the owner 
of certain waters flowing from artesian wells at Fairfield, 
and that the -company was in need of additional waters for 
the operation of its reduction mill at Manning, .Utah. The 
water was leased to the company for a ten-year period, with 
option to renew for an additional tenyears (Def. Ex. 2, pp. 
23-24). This agreement, with a similar agreement from 
the administrator of the D. L. Thomas Estate, to be oper-
ative in the event Ernest Carson did not complete his pur-
chase of the wells ( whieh he did) , was included in an ap-
proving order of the probate court and recorded on Janu-
ary 26, 1934, in the records of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, as shown by pages 16-24 of Def. Ex. 2 {T 418). 
After the company quit pumping in 1937, it was until1939 
supposed that it would make further use of the water at 
Mercur. The wells were capped when Manning discontin-
ued its operation, and since 1939 they have been capped 
_, more than they have been uncapped-in the Winter, par-
ticularly, at the request of the State Engineer (T 26-27, 
378-379, 437-439). 
In connection with this reference to the State Engi-
neer, it should be mentioned that in 1936 the defendants re-
ceived notice that they had to file a claim on the wells by 
a certain time. The claim was filed (Def. Ex. 1) through 
the agent for the State Engineer's office, who helped make 
it out .. This underground water claim No. 10987, dated 
March 19, 1936, shows the claimed flow at 60 gallons per 
minute, and claims the water fur irrigation and for stock-
watering, ·domestic or milling purposes. As pointed out 
heretofore, the claim expressly alleges that the water is a 
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part of the freehold, which gives force to the idea that de-
fendants were then relying upon the established rules of 
property hereinbefore mentioned. 
The court, in its Findings, goes to great length in an 
effort to explain why no one objected to defendants' leas-
ing of the well water (R 104). The inference seems to be 
that since water was scarce and the farmers had nothing 
to do, they consented that Carson might dispose of their 
water for his own profit. If the matter were simply to 
make possible the leasing of the water and if it were con-
sidered that the Fairfield Springs users in general owned 
it, there should at least have been some slight indication 
to this effect during all the years that Carson utilized and 
controlled the water W1der claim of right. Reference is 
made to the testimony of W. C. 'rhomas (T 188-192), now 
allied with plaintiff, that he knew his uncle claimed the 
wells; that he sold them to Carson; that the witness, him-
self, as his uncle's administrator, claimed the wells for the 
estate subject to Carson's rights and agreed that the es-
tate leased the wells to Manning Gold Mines Company if 
Carson did not go through with his contract to purchase. 
It was generally known throughout the town that he 
claimed the wells (T 204, 419-420) and the spring users 
never questioned his rights or made any protest to him 
(T 219, 236, 276, 394-395). The Court's purported finding 
is mere unsupported argumentation. 
There is another interesting and significant phase of 
the record which shows conclusively that the spring users 
or the plaintiff corporation, during the time Carson was 
leasing the water and thereafter, never had nor ·claimed 
any interest in the waters of the wells. It appears with-
out dispute that the well waters were better for culinary 
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purposes than even the waters from the springs which were, 
and are, being piped to the users (T 296). It also appears 
that .all of the spring users in 1935 held a meeting to decide 
upon drilling a well or wells for ·culinary use; yet, there 
was not even a suggestion made that defendants' well:s were 
under their control. Defendants' Exhibit 6, identified as 
the minutes orf the meeting in the handwriting of the sec-
---retary (T 334, 412-413), shows: 
"Meeting called to order at 8 p.m. on March 20, 
1935 by Abel Evans; Ralph Dubois was elected chair-
man, Leone ·Carson, secretary. A. Evans gave a re-
port of their visit to the drouth relief com. . . . . 
Mr. Evans asked how we could maintain a pressure 
pump. Different ideas were given about the pressure 
system and the present system. It was moved and 
seconded to vote on the pressure system or the pres-
ent system for a flowing well. . . . . We voted 
by a secret ballot. The voted numbered 1 for for pres-
sure system, 5 for present system, 12 for flowing well. 
Mr .. Evans moved that the well be driven on the ball-
park. The motion carried." (T 4 76-483) . 
As far as anyone knew, a tie to the Carson well was 
not even suggested (T 336-338), even though consider-
able work on the ·culinary system from the spring was done 
as late as 1939. The culinary system of the springs users 
was installed in 1911 (T 318) and replaced about 1939. The 
flow of the wells-· 60 gallons per minute--was adequate 
for these culinary needs; yet, neither in 1911 when the culi-
nary system was installed nor at any time since, did the 
spring users attempt to utilize the well waters for their 
culinary needs, although as above mentioned, they con-
sidered the drilling of another well. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
Ever sin~ 1930, the defendants have used the water 
either through their lessee, through others making permis-
sive use of the same under them, through watering their 
land between the wells and the springs, and whenever the 
water has got into the springs, through use of the full 
stream during their turns. They have also had complete 
control of the wells and have worked with them, repaired 
and capped them under instructions of the State Engineer 
and as they have themselves determined, all with the rec-
ognition, knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff and 
its predecessors in interest. 
If the well waters were public waters, the defe~dants 
were the first and only valid appropriators thereof sub-
sequent to their use by Sunshine Water Line Company. 
They, only, actually went upon the ground and diverted 
the water as underground water through works bolonging 
to, and controlled by, them; they, only, had the intent and 
purpose to appropriate and beneficially use said water as 
underground water and they, only, actually applied the wa-
ter to the full extent thereof through the years to a bene-
ficial purpose. All of the elements of a valid appropria-
tion were present prior to 1935, as well as since, and if the 
waters in question are deemed public waters, the recent 
case of Hansen v. Salt Lake City, U. , 205 
P.2d 255, shows that the defendants duly appropriated them 
as underground water prior to 1935 and that they have 
priority over the recent application filed by plaintiff with 
the State Engineer. We quote from page 261 of this de-
cision: 
"We do not have to determine whether the doc-
trine of the Hooppinia case is correct or not because 
here the facts are different. We, therefore, conclude 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
and hold that the right to the use of underground 
waters which prior to the Wrathall case were not con-
sidered the subject of appropriation, but which· were 
therein held to· be subject thereto, could be acquired 
prior to the 1935 enactments and amendments of our 
statutes on that subject by merely diverting such wa-
ters from their natural source and placing them to a 
beneficial use and that the plaintiff had, prior to the 
filing of the appUcation of the ·city with the State En-
gineer acquired a vested right to the use of the waters 
flowing from his well to the extent that he had placed 
them to a beneficial use as hereinbefore indicated, and 
that by filing his ·claim to such right to use such wa-
ters in accordance with the 1935 statute he has estab-
lished that right with a priority dated from his first 
use.'' 
5. The court, without evidence or reason, awarded 
the plaintiff rights of way over defendants' ground; the 
use of the wen casings and other appurtenances and other 
rights which it had never established; while o~ the other 
hand, it erroneously denied defendants even the right 
to have the well water flow in its existing channels and 
. the right for stockwatering from that channel or the 
springs. 
Findings 14, 15 and 17 of the trial court are to the 
effect that defendants have acquired no vested right to 
have the wen· water flow in their existing channels or any 
rights in the springs except as stockholders of plaintiff 
company, and that, on the other hand, by reason -of plain-
tiff's ownership of the water from the well and past usage, 
it has acquired adverse rights in defendants' lands and the 
right to use and control the pipe, caps, casings and other 
property of the defendants in ·connection with the well and 
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to enter, maintain, repair, remove and otherwise exercise 
dominion and control over the same. 
There is really no Finding of Fact as distinguished 
from argwnent or conclusions justifying the result in this 
respect; no prescriptive use is shown, no grant from the 
defendants or their predecessors in title and no other basis 
of the asserted right is indicated; yet, the decree grants 
plaintiff an injunction against defendants' interference ·with 
such unauthorized use of their property. 
When the spring area was dredged in 1949, some of 
the stockholders talked with the defendant, Ernest c·arson, 
and Carson told them that they could clean the springs 
out if they would take care of the dirt and that he would 
furnish them a place to dump it. They did not say "no" 
or "yes" (T 58-59), but later, in Carson's absence, they en-
larged the pond and left the . dirt piled up on the banks 
without disposition of it (T 57-59; Def. Ex. 21). 
What right by grant, ·Way of necessity, or otherwise, 
in defendants' lands does the record show plaintiff to 
have acquired? The plaintiff or its predecessors never 
asserted any right in, or used the ditch leading from, the 
wells. This was not a natural channel; there was no chan-
nel or other evidence of water when Sunshine Water Line 
Company began its. development work, as pointed out in 
the Statement of Facts herein. The company has never 
before asserted any rights in defendants' lands above the 
springs and has never sought to utilize any such rights. 
If one passively receives water flowing or draining off an-
other person's land, does he thereby acquire an interest in 
such land? If so, there would be few irrigated areas of 
the State which would not be· encumbered by rights of way 
for the passage of waste water, overflow or seepage. There. 
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is simply no evidence upon which the rights of way up to 
the wells can be predicated, or on which an injunction 
against defendants can be based. 
Equally unfounded is the court's Finding No. 16 that 
by reason of plaintiff's ownership of the water from the 
wells and "past usage", it has the right to go to the source 
of the well water and to repair the diversion works or open 
valves upon the pipes on the wells leading to the surface 
which may have been, or may be, placed thereon by de-
fendants or anyone else, and that neither it nor its agents 
shall be liable for trespass so long as they go upon the chan-
nel as the same may be reasonably necessary to reach the 
source of the water. This is hardly a Finding of Fact with 
respect to the basis of such asserted rights; but if it were, 
and even though it supported the ·Conclusions and Decree 
virtually condemning defendants' land and property with-
out compensation, it would not be based on any facts es-
tabHshed in the record. Rights of way or other easements 
in land cannot be so acquired. The court in effect has 
made plaintiff the owners of the very casings and pipes 
forming a part of defendants' land, since it has given con-
trol over them, with t~e right to maintain and repair them 
and since it has enjoined defendants from interfering there-
with. This presents a strange anomoly, involving the fur-
nishing to plaintiff of not only the water from defendants' 
land, but the pipes, casings, valves and other property 
necessary for its use. 
The court gave the plaintiff the right to maintain the 
present pond ·channel, whereas, there was no grant of any 
right in defendants' lands or any acquisition of any right 
by prescription for the enlarged pond area resulting from 
the 1949 dredging. 
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An easement acquired by prescription is always lizni .. 
ted by the use made dwing the prescriptive period. Salis-
bury v. Rockport Irrigation Co., 79 U. 398, 7 P.2d 291. On 
the basis of what adverse use can the award of the inter-
ests in defendants' land and property be justified? There 
seems no justification whatsoever. A very late Washing-
ton case highlights the necessity of adversity in establish-
ing prescriptive right, as well as the required period of 
use. Sharp, et ux v. Keizling, 214 P.2d 163. 
Plaintiff and the .lower court have circumvented the ne-
cessity of condemnation. There is no case here, such as Ri-
ordan v. Westwood, supra, where the entry on another per-
son's land in an attempt to initiate an appropriation, was 
made in good faith under the assumption that public land 
was involved. We do not even have any prior entry 
made or claimed until shortly before the comm~ncement 
of this action. The land was, and is, known to belong to 
the Carsons; no right of entry to, or around, the wells by 
grant, prescription or otherwise was shown, and yet the 
court assumed to freely award rights of way and related 
rights in connection with the wells to defendants. If this 
could validly be done for no better reason than here shown, 
there would be no reason for condemnation proceedings, 
and no point in the comment of the court in the last men-
tioned case when it said (p. 931) : 
"Had defendant been notified or had reason to be-
lieve that this land was privately owned it would have 
been his duty to proceed in accordance with Section 
100-3-19, U.C.A., 1943, before entering upon the land 
. . . . Had he deliberately gone onto the plain-
tiff's land knowing that he was committing a trespass, 
it might well be that such trespass would nullify hii; 
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right to appropriate this water, but under the circum-
stances here disclosed· such is not the effect. 
"Of course the applicant cannot even under this 
decision enter the lands of the plaintiff to further see 
if he can develop this water right without either get-
ting permission from the plaintiff or condemning a 
rig-ht of way over the land and paying for all damages 
which he causes therein." 
In contrast to the liberality of the trial court in award-
ing to plaintiff rights and privileges on defendants' land, 
consider the attitude of the court toward defendants' rights 
even on the theory the court adopted. If the water had 
actually run from the well down a channel over defendants' 
ground for a long period of time, as plaintiff asserted as 
a basis of its claim of usage, the defendants would at least 
have had a right to a continuation of that flow by reason 
of its beneficial effect upon their land between the wells 
and the springs, irrespective of the other use of the water. 
Riordan v. Westwood, supra., p. 930. Moreover, defend-
ants established a stockwatering right which was not recog-
nized by the court (T 16-17, 21, 141). Adams v. Portage· 
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 U. 1, 72 P.2d 648. 
The court erroneously denied any such rights on the part 
of the defendants. It did recognize that the flow of water 
from the wells on defendants' lands irrigated a small area 
beneficially (Finding No. 11). It made no finding what-
soever on defendants' claims to stockwatering rights, but 
it concluded (Conclusion No. 4) that they had no rights 
whatsoever in the springs or well e:x:cept as stockholders 
of plaintiff company. 
The reversal of the ·court's judgment and the award 
of the wells and their flow to defendants will, of course, 
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take care of many of these errors and inconsistencies. Yet, 
even with the well waters confirmed in defendants, they 
should have the right to maintain their livestock in the 
vicinity of the springs, as they have in the past, and should 
not be left to face the claim that since no stockwatering 
rights were recognized in the judgment, they cannot in the 
future run their livestock on their lands surrounding the 
springs. 
6. Repeated trespasses on the part of plaintiff were 
shown both on land over which the court hteld that the 
plaintiff had rights of way and on other land; it was also 
shown, and effectually admitted, that plaintiff intended to 
continue such trespasses. . The court therefore erred in 
finding that only one or two trespasses had been commit-
ted, and in failing to award defendants injlUlctive relief to 
prevent future threatened trespasses. 
If this Court determines, as we think it will, that plain-
tiffs have no interest in the wells in question, all of its en-
tries upon defendants' land in the vicinity of the wells must 
be deemed trespasses. In any event, no valid rights of way 
to, or in, the vicinity of the wells were proved. Even though 
it be assumed that plaintiff had acquired such rights along 
the channels or, more accurately stated, along the artifi-
cial ditches leading up to the wells, the undisputed evidence 
shows repeated trespasses beyond the scope of these as-
sumd rights and a determination on the part of plaintiff 
to continue such trespasses. 
In plaintiff's complaint, broad rights of entry upon de-
fendants' lands are asserted which were never sustained by 
the evidence (R 23-24). Repeated trespasses were com-
mitted by plaintiff's agents on defendants' lands, not limi-
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ted to any channel (T 139-140, 370, 371-373). Defendants' 
title was fully established (T 15; Def. Ex. 2) and confinned 
by the court's Findings (R 112) . 
The vice president of the plaintiff corporation testf .. 
fied that he, with the board of directors, despite their be--
ing forbidden by Ernest Carson to do so, went on his 
grounds ·in the vicinity of the wells, and he insisted at the 
trial that he had the right to do so, and claimed that right 
on _behalf of the plaintiff company (T 255-256, 257, 258). 
Another officer testified that the agents of plaintiff have 
been up to the wells with a wrench trying to turn the well 
water on (T 328, 329). The attitude of plaintiff's agents 
was that they should be permitted to go freely upon de-
fendants' lands without even being observed by the Car-
sons (T 329, 330). The secretary of ~the plaintiff company, 
up until the time of the trial, and particularly when the 
complaint was filed, claimed the right to enter defend-
ants' land around the springs and any part of it as he chose 
(T 346). Another officer of the company, Smith, admit-
ted that he and his fellow officers had been on Mr. Carson's 
land around the wells repeatedly, not confined to any chaD:-
nel, and that this was without Mr. ~carson's permission and 
that as an officer of the corporation, he still claimed the 
right to do so (T 361-362). In fact, this officer expressly 
testified that unless they were restrained by the court, they 
intended to not only clean out the springs, but to enlarge 
. the area of this work beyond such springs and to go on oth-
er parts of defendants' land and to go up toward the wells 
and to dig up there at places where no one had ever dug 
before (T 364-365) . 
When plaintiff's officers were discovered on defend-
ants' land they asserted their -claimed rights to be there 
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notwithstanding that they were not along any channel (T 
371-372). Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the corpora-
tion had no right to go on defendants' land other than in 
the pond area and the channel draining the water there-
from, down to the Fairfield headgates (T 365-366). 
Despite such record, the trial court contented itself 
with finding one, or at the most two, trespasses were com-
mitted (Finding 17). As heretofore pointed out, the court 
gave the plaintiff various rights in the defendants' land 
above the pond and up to the wells, and as may now be 
seen, refused to enjoin the violation of defendants' property 
rights even at other places. 
Repeated trespasses are a proper matter for injunc-
tive relief, and when it is apparent that they may ripen 
into an easement the court will readily grant an injunction. 
28 Am. Jur., "Injunctions", Sec. 137, pp. 326-327. In this 
connection, it is notable that the trespasses upon the land 
of defendants referred to above were all within the year 
or so preceding the trial and that prior thereto, plaintiff 
had never manifested any interest in, or claim to, the wells 
or rights of way in connection therewith. So, without the 
passage of any prescriptive period, the court recognized, 
and the plaintiff now claims, rights of way or easements 
over defendants' lands. Unless plaintiff is enjoined, these 
claims will multiply and enlarge, until defendants just as 
well give up and move away. It should not be the province 
of any court to cause, or suffer, any such violation of prop-
erty rights. The court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant defendants injunctive relief. 
7. The application which plaintiff filed in 1950 not 
only is subordina~ and subject to defendants' rights to 
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the well water, but is ineffectual and void insQfar as it pur-
ports ~o secure a general right to the waters on or under 
the land therein described. 
Plaintiff offered in evidence, as its Exhibit "A", a cer-
tified ·Copy of Application 21275, filed in the office of the 
State Engineer on January 5, 1950, by one B. Z. Kastler, 
Jr., and assigned to plaintiff company. It was received in 
evidence over defendants' objection, among other grounds, 
that it was not such an application as ·can be made under 
the law with any legal effect, and that the application was 
simply an arbitrary designation of a "Spring area" in an 
attempt to tie up all the water in that area, which in legal 
principle, might just as well be the entire State of Utah 
(T 5). 
This applicaion described a large tract of land, the 
greater portion of which belongs to defendants, which is 
arbitrarily described as a 'Spring .area." The apparent ob-
ject is to acquire or tie up all of the water on or under that 
land and make impossible· any futuer development of water 
on said· land by defendants or others.. We do not think 
such an application is ·contemplated by 100-3-2, U.C.A., 
1943, as amended by Laws of Utah, 1949, concerning ap-
plications for the right to use unappropriated public wa-
ter and their required contents. If one can control the 
future development and use of the waters underlying a 
forty-acre area by the mere filing of an application and 
proceedings thereunder, he can do so with respect to 100 
acres, or a whole county, particularly if he does not have 
to relate his appUcation to specific locations, springs, chan-
nels or pipes. It is noted under "Explanatory" on the ap-
plication in question that it is generally proposed, among 
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other things, to construct "new drains ~and tunnels to de-
velop new \Vater which is not now issuing from the spring 
area." 
The idea of plaintiff's engineer with respect to the 
"Spring area" which he described, originated with what 
he had been told by some persons whom he could not iden-
tify (T 107-108). His investigation disclosed no spring 
area apart from the springs and seeps near the pond or 
in the wash immediately to the north, which formed only a 
part of the "Spring area" described in plaintiff's applica-
tion. Plaintiff's Ex. "E", does not represent any actual 
spring area, for it includes the old wells and sump, and 
other points undefined, while the engineer admitted that 
only where he marked "springs" on the map is there any 
surface indication (T 12). He admitted that he furnished 
the plaintiff a description to go into its application based 
upon the area containing meadow or salt gmss, indicating 
to him that it "might have ground water sufficiently near 
the surface so as to make it profitable to channel to it 
and drain it" (T 116-117). But even such grass land ly-
ing north of the springs formed only a small portion of the 
area described in the application, which in large part is 
actually no spring area, parti:cul:arly in the vicinity of the 
wells (T 117, 124-125, 137). A substantial amount of land 
within the described "Spring area" is sagebrush land with-
out any evidence of water (T 138). He indicated that the 
true spring area adready had been dredged which would 
mean that it actually compriseQ merely the area under 
the present pond. 
The engineer's observations were made in December 
and March and manifestly what was a seep area and what 
was not, would be difficult for him to determine (T 125, 
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127). He made no borings to determine the heighth of 
the water table (T 128-219). Any evidence of surface wa-
ter which he claimed to have seen in the vicinity of the 
wells came from the wells, the depth of which he did not 
know (T 129) . 
The idea in surveying a description for the claimed 
"spring area," according to the plaintiff's engineer, was to 
make a description so large that they thought they could 
cover every possibility of water development in the area 
(T 1388). While the "Spring area" described in the ap-
plication covers more than 40 acres ( P. Ex. "C") the ac-
tual spring acre covers about an acre and a half to two 
and one-half acres (T 148, 226). 
The trial court's Findings 12, 18 and 19 assumed to 
recognize the validity of plaintiff's application and the right 
to proceed on plaintiff's land thereunder, and Conclusion 
of Law No. 7 and paragraph 3 of the Decree adjudicate 
the effectiveness df this application as against defendants. 
Such an application should not remain unchallenged, either 
by us or by this Court, for if the principle of it is accepted, 
large areas 'Can be tied up, as plaintiff is seeking to tie up 
defendants' land, and their water economy frozen or made 
static for the speculation or profit of, or oppression by, 
interests opposed to the individual land owner. 
CO·NCLUSION 
Sunshine Water Line ·Company was admittedly the 
owner of the wells, their waters and the l~and on which they 
were situated up to at least 1905. The wells were part of 
the land, and the right to their flow was an incident of the 
ownership of the land. D. L. Thomas acquired the title 
of Sunshine Water Line Company by tax deed and through 
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suit to quiet title. The defendant, Ernest Carson, acquired 
the title of D. L. Thomas by warranty deed dated April 14, 
1930, conveying and warranting the wells and the land, and 
all of his rights vested prior to 1935. He has maintained 
those rights ever since and owned, and had, possession of 
the land, the wells and the water therefrom at the time of 
the institution of this action. His rights were completed 
and vested at a time when our courts as a rule of prop-
erty recognized that percolating waters were not public 
waters, but belonged to the soil, are the property of the 
owner thereof, and are not subject to appropriation. That 
rule was changed after 1935, but dicta in Riordan v. West-
wood, supra, that the question should be treated as if this 
new concept had always existed, can have no application 
to the case at bar where the rights of defendants vested 
under the old concept as an established rule of property. 
There was no abandonment or forfeiture of the well water 
by Sunshine Water Line Company or its successors since 
the statute had no reference to private water and since 
under any -construction the water was not, either in law 
or in fact, abandoned and since if there were any tempo-
rary discontinuance of its use, such use was resumed by 
the title holders before any other rights attached. 
The plaintiff acquired no interest in the wells or their 
flow because prior to 1935 the water was private water 
not subject to appropriation and, even though it were 
deemed public water, plaintiff or its predecessors made no 
diversion, merely passively receiving such water flowing 
into the springs, which as far as plaintiff or its predecessors 
were concerned, was surface waters which could be. ap-
propriated, if at all, only by an application with the State 
Engineer, whi.ch it failed to file until after defendants' 
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rights as appropriators of underground water attached 
and became vested. Prior to the time any rights to the 
flow of the wells attached other than the rights of the own-
ers of the land, to-wit: in 1933, and continuing to 1937, 
defendants, through their lessee, Manning Gold Mining 
Company, actually diverted and pumped the water of the 
wells and applied the entire flow to a beneficial use under 
claim of right, thereby affecting an appropriation of the 
water, as underground water, if the same could be deemed 
public water. 
The lower court not only erroneously failed to recog-
nize defendants' rights in the wells, but refused to recog-
nize their right to have the water flow as it has in the past 
for the irrigation of their lands enroute to the springs, or 
the right of the defendants for stockwatering, but on the 
contrary, gave plaintiff leave to go upon defendants' lands 
above the springs and in the vicinity of the wells and to 
control and, in effect, appropriate the pipe, casings and 
ether property comprising the wells-rights which it had 
never asserted nor enjoyed before--and permanently en-
joined the defendants from interfering with such encroach-
ments. Making possible, and inviting, further encroach-
ments in the future, notwithstanding undenied repeated 
trespasses and the expressed intent to continue them on 
the part of plaintiff's officers, the court refused to enjoin 
plaintiff from committing trespasses even outside of the 
elaimed rights of way of the plaintiff as recognized by the 
court. 
Finally, the court, in effect, recognized the plaintiff's 
recent application before the State Engineer as giving it 
the right to all of the underground water underlying a large 
area of land belonging to defendants, without reference to 
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any particular source or place, thereby virtually prevent-
ing any future development of water on their own land 
unless, as we contend, such application is void and inef-
fectual as a matter of law. 
Thus, these property owners have not only been de-
prived of the wells and the water therefrom, but the physi-
cal material making up the wells and appurtenances, the 
control of their lands outside of the pond area which they 
have enjoyed at all times heretofore, protection against 
continued trespasses, the right to run and water livestock 
on their land, and, in fact, all future possibilities of them-
selves developing additional underground waters uncon-
nected with the wells or existing springs because of a gen-
eral application seeking to reserve to plaintiff water de-
velopment rights upon, or under, defendants' ground. Most 
of the rights so given to plaintiff were never claimed, used 
or even suggested by it until shortly before the institution 
of this action in 1950. 
The trial court unfortunately has committed grievous 
error in this case. If those erros are permitted to stand 
the property rights of the defendants will be confi·scated 
unjustly. This being an equity case, the Supreme Court 
should direct Findings, Conclusions and Decree to the ef-
fect that defendants are the exclusive owners of the wells 
and the flow therefrom; that plaintiff has no rights in de-
fendants' land outside the original spring pond area and the 
channel leading toward Fairfieid therefrom, and that if 
it wishes additional rights, it should acquire them by con-
demnation or purchase; that plaintiff be enjoined from tres-
passing upon the lands of defendants outside of the immedi-
ate original pond area and the channel diverting water 
therefrom; that defendants have the right to water and 
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maintain livestock on their lands adjacent to said pond, and 
that the plaintiff's Application No. 21275 to the extent 
that it purports to cover any water other than in, and un-
derlying, the spring pond is void and ineffectual. Defend-
ants also pray for their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants. 
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